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1. Introduction 
1.1 Prefatory emarks 
 “I have already told you with what care they look after their sick, so that nothing is left undone that can 
contribute either to their case or health; and for those who are taken with fixed and incurable diseases, they 
use all possible ways to cherish them and to make their lives as comfortable as possible. They visit them 
often and take great pains to make their time pass off easily; but when any is taken with a torturing and 
lingering pain, so that there is no hope either of recovery or ease, the priests and magistrates come and 
exhort them, that, since they are now unable to go on with the business of life, are become a burden to 
themselves and to all about them, and they have really out-lived themselves, they should no longer nourish 
such a rooted distemper, but choose rather to die since they cannot live but in much misery; being assured 
that if they thus deliver themselves from torture, or are willing that others should do it, they shall be 
happy after death: since, by their acting thus, they lose none of the pleasures, but only the troubles of life, 
they think they behave not only reasonably but in a manner consistent with religion and piety; because 
they follow the advice given them by their priests, who are the expounders of the will of God. Such as are 
wrought on by these persuasions either starve themselves of their own accord, or take opium, and by that 
means die without pain. But no man is forced on this way of ending his life; and if they cannot be 
persuaded to it, this does not induce them to fail in their attendance and care of them: but as they believe 
that a voluntary death, when it is chosen upon such an authority, is very honourable, so if any man takes 
away his own life without the approbation of the priests and the senate, they give him none of the honours 
of a decent funeral, but throw his body into a ditch.”1 Sir Thomas More (1516) 
In 1977, Leon Eisenberg suggested a distinction should be made between the terms “disease” 
and “illness” (Eisenberg, 1977): “The dysfunctional consequences of the Cartesian dichotomy have 
been enhanced by the power of biomedical technology. Technical virtuosity reifies the mechanical model 
and widens the gap between what patients seek and doctors provide. Patients suffer ‘’illnesses’’; doctors 
diagnose and treat ’’disease’’. Illnesses are experiences of discontinuities in states of being and perceived 
role performances. Diseases, in the scientific paradigm of modern medicine, are abnormalities in the 
function and/or structure of body organs and systems. Traditional healers also redefine illness as disease: 
because they share symbols and metaphors consonant with lay beliefs, their healing rituals are more 
responsive to the psychosocial context of illness…When physicians dismiss illness because ascertainable 
’’disease’’ is absent, they fail to meet their socially assigned responsibility. It is essential to reintegrate 
‘’scientific”  and ’’social’’ concepts of disease and illness as a basis for a functional system of medical 
research and care.”. 
                                                 
1 Direct quotations appear in italics. 
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Allan Young (Young, 1982) draws a further distinction between “disease”, “illness” and 
“sickness”: “DISEASE retains its original meaning (organic pathologies and abnormalities). 
ILLNESS is essentially the same, referring to how disease and sickness are brought into the  
individual consciousness. SICKNESS (…) is redefined as the process through which worrisome 
behavioral and biological signs, particularly ones originating in disease, are given socially 
recognizable meanings, i.e. they are made into symptoms and socially significant outcomes. Every 
culture has rules for translating signs into symptoms, for linking symptomatologies to etiologies 
and interventions,and for using the evidence provided by interventions to confirm translations and 
legitimize outcomes. The path a person follows from translation to socially significant outcome 
constitutes his sickness. Sickness is, then, a process for socializing disease and illness”. These 
ideas were later reinstated by other authors and publications, such as The Hastings Center 
Report: The Goals of Medicine. Setting New Priorities (Callahan et al., 1996). In this 
document, “disease” is defined as a physical or mental dysfunction, based on a deviation 
from the statistical standard, which causes impairment or increases the probability of an 
early death; “illness” is understood as an individual's subjective perception that his or her 
physical or mental wellness is either altered or absent, affecting the ability to perform 
normal daily activities as a consequence; “sickness” is the social perception of an 
individual’s health status, usually, an external perception that this individual has physical 
or mental difficulties. 
The different realities of patients, their families, physicians and society at large, which will 
be discussed below, lead us to consider an anthropological perspective in which the medical 
point of view of terminal disease is integrated with another that takes into account the 
suffering patients and their families undergo (terminal illness) and with the polymorphous 
interpretation made by the family and society (terminal sickness).  
If we consider that the meaning of a word is made up of the set of relations (both situational 
and paradigmatic) reflected in that word, and that those relations are built all through the 
history of mankind and each individual’s own history, we should understand that it is not 
possible to provide univocal answers in the case of such an expression as "terminal disease", 
which carries multiple meanings with it. 
The medical description of terminal disease, the suffering patients and their families 
undergo, and the view society holds are often mutually and internally contradictory. The 
situation arising out of this is both complex and dynamic, hence the need for a dialogue 
focused on the suffering endured by the “protosufferers” (patients and next of kin) when it 
comes to making decisions involving them. 
The meaning of terminal disease should ultimately be a single, non-reproducible, 
contextualized construction, one which embodies the dialectic contribution made by the 
various agents involved.  
The purpose of this paper is to question the pretended univocity of the definition of 
terminal disease as it is understood from an exclusively unidimensional approach (the 
medical one), definition which, from a functional point of view, turns out to be a rigid 
concept that imposes itself over the needs of patients, their families, and even healthcare 
workers.  
It should be borne in mind that the definition of terminal disease is not intended to be solely 
descriptive, but, as it is later observed, it has a determining functional nature. Based on it, it 
could be determined whether a particular treatment is futile or not, or if therapeutic 
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obstinacy or neglect is evidenced, or whether those who are close to the patient (next of kin, 
caregivers and therapists) are respectful of the patient’s dignity. 
It could be said that decision-making from a functional perspective frequently fails to 
overtly specify whether a given disease is terminal or not. However, an in-depth look into 
the matter reveals that it does so implicitly, in so far as it considers whether the 
implementation of measures which will unnecessarily prolong life and/or the suffering of 
patients and their families is unsubstantial or not. 
The concept of terminal disease will be discussed all through this paper; however, it is 
convenient to clarify ad initio that, in fact, there are no terminal diseases but terminal 
patients, and this is precisely the main guiding principle behind this work. Reification of the 
concept of terminal disease, disregarding the terminal patient, frees many from the burden 
of disentangling the complex, dynamic nature of each situation in particular and the 
commitment which that entails.  
2. Terminal disease, terminal illness and terminal sickness 
2.1 Terminal disease or the medical point of view 
The definition of terminal disease is seemingly simple, clear and univocal. The Spanish 
Society of Palliative Care (Sociedad Española de Cuidados Paliativos [SECPAL, n.d.]), for 
example, provides the following definition:  
“In the case of terminal diseases, a number of elements should be present. These elements are 
important not only to consider a terminal disease as such but also to determine the most suitable 
therapy. 
The key elements are: 
1. Presence of advanced, progressive, incurable disease. 
2. Reasonable unresponsiveness to the specific treatment.  
3. Presence of multiple, changing, severe symptoms or problems of multifactorial origin. 
4. Great emotional impact on the patient, the family and healthcare workers, closely related to the 
implicit or explicit immediacy of death. 
5. Life expectancy of six months or less.  
This complex situation requires the uninterrupted provision of appropriate care and support.  
End-stage CANCER, AIDS, motor neuron disease, specific organ system failure (kidney, heart, liver 
failure, etc.) meet these criteria to a greater or lesser extent. Traditionally, providing adequate care to 
end-stage cancer patients has been the raison d'etre of Palliative Care. 
It is ESSENTIAL not to consider a potentially curable patient as terminally ill.” 
Some of the controversial aspects of this definition will be discussed below. It is worth 
pointing out, however, that this definition is not to be rejected entirely. In fact, it could be 
accepted as a guideline, but not as a dogma that should be asserted over concrete 
decisions.  
2.1.1 How advanced, incurable and progressive a disease should be to be considered 
terminal  
2.1.1.1 Advanced disease and life expectancy 
An 84-year-old male patient has a 10-year history of dementia. For the last three years, he 
has been bedridden, unable to walk, with incontinence of bowel and bladder. His ability to 
communicate is nearly lost (he occasionally answers “yes” or “no” to questions), he does not 
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react to simple commands, and he rarely recognizes loved ones. He does not present 
swallowing difficulties but is unable to feed himself (he requires help from a caregiver). 
Could this patient be considered terminally ill?  
In his statement for the Association of Alzheimer Disease, SG Post expresses that  
“the advanced stage of dementia includes a loss of all or nearly all ability to communicate by 
speech, inability to recognize loved ones in most cases, loss of ambulation without assistance, 
incontinence of bowel and/or bladder, and some weight loss due to swallowing difficulties. The 
advanced stage is generally considered terminal, with death occurring on average within two 
years.” (Post, 2007).  
The preceding definition extends life expectancy from the maximum of six months, as stated 
by the Spanish Society of Palliative Care, to an average of two years. This evident 
inconsistency of criteria shows us that the definition of the concept from the medical 
perspective is not univocal.  
At the age of 42, Stephen Jay Gould, the famous paleontologist, was diagnosed with an 
abdominal mesothelioma and was informed that the median mortality after discovery was 8 
months. In his article “The Median isn’t the Message”, Gould explains why it is the variance 
more than the mean, or the median in his case, what should be taken into account to 
establish a disease prognosis. The reason he gives is that the most common statistical 
measures of central tendency (either the mean or the median) are useful only to define a 
Platonic state but not the hard reality of the dispersion of results (Gould, 1985). Gould died 
at the age of 62. 
Defining how advanced a disease is by establishing a period of time which is not only 
arbitrary but dubious as an estimate seems to be far from functional when it comes to 
making the kind of decisions we are concerned with. In other words, as it was once 
expressed by Sir William Osler (Osler, n.d.), “Medicine is a science of uncertainty and an art of 
probability”. 
2.1.1.2 Incurable, untreatable and disease-modifying drugs  
In medicine, it is well-known that incurable is not synonymous with untreatable. Also, for 
certain diseases, there are therapies which, without being necessarily palliative, modify 
disease progression without curing it. In other words, disease progression in a group of 
subjects receiving a new drug may be statistically better relative to a particular aspect when 
compared to an untreated group.  
The fact that a disease is incurable but its progression may be slowed down creates a grey 
area between “curable and incurable”. Disease-modifying drugs are useful but they do not 
cure.  
Furthermore, certain measures considered therapeutic or even curative in some cultures are 
not accepted in others. A clear example is the rejection of blood transfusion by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.  
2.1.1.3 Lack of primary injury progression is not synonymous with lack of disease 
progression 
Non-progressive secondary injuries may put a patient at such a risk that, in the event of 
complications, they may cause his or her death.  
Patients with severe sequelae, such as irreversible permanent vegetative state following 
anoxic or traumatic brain injury, who exhibit no progression of their primary brain injury, 
may be maintained in that state through intensive care procedures. These procedures are 
usually implemented to prevent the occurrence of complications or to reverse them if they 
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occur. Yet, in settings with less sophisticated means, patients are expected to progress 
towards death. Anencephaly could be mentioned as another example of nonviable disease, 
possibly comparable to an irreversible vegetative state; it is terminal but it does not meet the 
progressiveness criteria required in the definition. 
In spite of the lack of primary injury progression, there could be modifications which may 
improve or worsen the clinical condition, thus challenging the univocal definition of the 
term “progressive disease”.  
Furthermore, there are dimensions in the progression of a disease which cannot be seen 
from an exclusively biological perspective, such as the social and psychological impact that 
failure of recovery has on patients, their families and even the community (and this impact 
can certainly be progressive). In other words, there may not be an “unfavourable” 
progression in biological terms but there could be one from a psychological and/or social 
point of view.  
2.1.2 Discussion 
While a two-valued logic provides us with safe, clear definitions (advanced vs.  
not advanced, progressive vs. non-progressive, incurable vs. curable), our patients' 
individual situations, seen from a medical perspective, challenge us to adhere to a multi-
valued, even fuzzy, logic, in which “things are to the extent they are, and things are not to 
the extent they are not“, and in which “nothing exists by itself but in relation to other 
things”.  
If we understand that there are no diseases but patients, that there are no absolute, timeless 
realities but concrete, historical circumstances in which individuals live, get sick and die, the 
criteria to define a disease as advanced, progressive or incurable vary, and, as we have 
already mentioned, they need to be specified by medical professionals considering each 
individual case. 
2.2 Terminal illness or the patient’s perspective 
Recently published news articles in Argentina (Carbajal, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011d), 
described the situation of a 19-year-old girl (MG) who had been diagnosed with 
neurofibromatosis type I (Von Recklinghausen disease). The girl considered she had an 
“advanced” form of the disease. She was bedridden and had severe shortness of breath; 
however, she was in full possession of her mental faculties. “It is not fair to live like this. 
Nearly all of my body is numb, and whatever I feel is painful. I can’t even hold a cup in my hand, and 
I'm forced to lie down all the time. I choke, I can’t breathe. This is not a life worth living; I don’t want 
to go on like this. But they don’t understand, they think one can  always pull through. But I can’t 
bear it any longer, I simply can’t”, one of the articles transcribed. Despite her medical 
condition, MG was lucid and was very clear when expressing her position. Physicians 
considered that hers was not a terminal disease; nonetheless, the patient wanted to be given 
sedatives to induce unconsciousness and stop feeling pain.  
The case became known to the public. Melina, that was her name, was apparently sedated in 
the end, and died a few days after the media published her case (Carbajal, 2011e, 2011f). 
Ramón Sampedro was a patient who was not considered terminal from a medical point of 
view. He was quadriplegic due to a traumatic cervical spine injury, and was bedridden for 
more than 30 years as a consequence of this. In his “Letters from Hell”, where he claimed to 
be living in, he expressed (Sampedro, 2004), (translation is mine): 
“To no avail, I say to them: No!, I am dead!,  
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I tell them I can’t speak like them 
Because it is absurd to speak as human beings do 
And they don’t let me be, either dead or alive 
These crazy, freaked-out nuts”  
A different situation is that of Stephen Hawking’s, who could find his purpose in life despite 
having a progressive disease and being severely disabled. Yet, no comparison between these 
two patients’ moral values is intended, this last example has been introduced to show that 
personal experiences with a particular medical condition vary greatly.  
In his 1845 short story, “The Facts in the Case of Mr. Valdemar” (Poe, 1845), Edgar Allan Poe 
presents a visionary metaphor of today’s intensive care units with their intervened deaths 
which is worth commenting on. Mr. Valdemar, who is “in articulo mortis”, accepts to 
undergo an experimental hypnotic technique and he is suspended between life and death 
for a period of seven months. During that time, he is not allowed to die but he cannot be 
awakened either. The objective of the investigator carrying out the experiment is to find out 
up to what extent or for how long, the hypnotic process would be able to prevent death 
from occurring. During the 7-month experiment, Mr. Valdemar is visited by physicians and 
friends and receives continuous nursing care. All through this process, however, Mr. P (the 
mesmerist) is unable to make decisions. It is Mr. Valdermar himself who, given the 
investigator’s inability, begs: “For God´s sake! -quick!-quick!–put me to sleep-or, quick!– waken 
me!–quick!–I say to you that I am dead.”.  
In light of a helpless but grandiose medicine, which does not allow either to live or to die, it 
is the undead who demands changing the status quo.  
JV, a 38-year old male patient who suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, was fully 
aware of his disease and its prognosis. Percutaneous gastrostomy for enteral feeding was 
suggested when he was still able to undergo the procedure, but he rejected it. He also 
expressly refused in writing to receive invasive or non-invasive ventilatory support of any 
kind. He was later hospitalized due to an infectious complication. At that moment, he was 
unable to express himself orally (he communicated what he wanted to say by pointing at 
letters on a sign with his right index finger). To our surprise, when his wife asked him 
whether he still rejected ventilatory support, despite not being dyspneic at that time, he 
reproached her for such a question because it seemed to suggest she wanted him to die. 
Then, he indicated that he obviously wanted to be provided with ventilatory support if it 
was required. A few days later, it was necessary to implement the support. The patient 
survived 4 months in the intensive care unit and finally died.  
In 2008, the case of a 13-year-old girl named Hannah Jones became known to the public. 
She had previously suffered from leukemia and refused to have a heart transplant to treat 
a chemotherapy-induced cardiomyopathy (BBC News, 2008). Her attending physicians 
sought court intervention to force her to undergo surgery. The media informed that 
physicians recommended the transplant as the only solution available, but they could not 
guarantee survival after the surgery. And, if she survived, her leukemia could relapse and 
her new heart would last ten years at the most. Hannah decided that she had suffered 
long enough and told her physicians that she preferred to spend the rest of her life 
without having to go through another traumatic treatment. Her parents were supportive 
of her decision, but the hospital where she was being treated in Herefordshire interfered 
with Hannah’s decision. Physicians warned Hannah’s mother, Kirsty (a nurse), that they 
would apply for a court order at the High Court in London to remove the child’s  
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custody from them. The following day a child protection officer visited Hannah at  
home. Nobody knows what Hannah said to the officer, but, a few hours later, the Hospital 
Legal Department withdrew the legal action. “The girl is firm in her decision to refuse 
surgery”, said the child protection officer. “It is incredible that such a young person who has 
gone through so many things has the courage to defend her rights", her father Andrew proudly 
said. 
Hannah did not have what in medical terms would be considered a terminal disease; 
however, she made the decision to refuse the suggested treatments with apparent autonomy 
and competence. She had already decided that her illness was terminal. She could have been 
wrong, but so could have been her physicians thus prolonging her suffering.  
Dr Tony Calland, chairman of the British Medical Association's ethics committee, is quoted 
in the same BBC News article: “a child of Hannah's age was able to make an informed decision to 
refuse treatment”. Dr Calland said he understood why a doctor might have taken this action. He said: 
"I think some doctors take the view that they must intervene and they are making that decision in 
what they see as the best interests of the patient. But of course best interests of patients is not just the 
best medical interests - it's the overall holistic interests of the person in general." He added: "I think 
obviously a child of 13 with these circumstances should be perfectly capable of making the decision 
and particularly when supported by the parents.”.  
In the city of Mar del Plata, Argentina, a patient was admitted to the General Acute Care 
Hospital (Hospital Interzonal de Agudos) with a history of diabetes and gangrene in the 
right foot. Above-knee leg amputation was performed on August 9, 1995 after obtaining 
consent from the patient (he had denied consent previously). On August 16, 1995 he was 
diagnosed with necrosis of the left first and fourth toes, cellulitis and edema involving the 
entire foot were also observed. On August 23, 1995 he was diagnosed with vascular 
ischemia of the left lower limb. Below-knee amputation was indicated, but the patient 
refused to undergo this procedure. The following was documented with respect to his 
refusal: “The patient refuses to receive treatment, his decision being entered into his medical record. 
Considering that the patient is lucid, we deem it advisable to notify the Direction in the event of a 
legal issue.”. The patient was perfectly lucid and fully aware that he was putting his life at 
risk. The Hospital Ethics Committee stated that patient autonomy should be respected. 
However, court intervention was sought, and the judgment was granted in favour of the 
patient and his decision (Hooft, 1995).  
As we have already mentioned, a typical example in which the concept of “terminality” 
differs between patients and physicians is that of Jehovah's Witnesses. A Jehovah's Witness 
patient who presents with hemorrhage caused by a treatable condition prefers to refuse 
blood transfusion and die rather than violate his or her religious beliefs for a treatment not 
considered as such.  
Autonomous and competent patients who refuse a particular treatment and put their lives 
at risk when making such a decision provide their own concept of “terminality”, different 
from their physicians' concept.  
The poet (Victor Jara) expresses “life is eternal in five minutes”. A few days or hours stolen 
from death may be enough for some patients to reconcile with their loved ones or to say 
goodbye to them. Conversely, a few minutes or hours, or sometimes months or years, may 
be tormentous for other patients because of the physical, mental and/or moral suffering 
they have to endure during that time. Those who find meaning in the agony of the last 
moments of life are no better than those who no longer find a reason to go on living.  
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2.2.1 Discussion 
In any case, patients themselves are the ones who have to endure suffering. Our role as 
family members, friends and healthcare providers is to cooperate with them in the 
construction of their own meaning of life and death, as long as they allow us to do so.  
2.3 Terminal sickness or the perspective of the family, caregivers, next of kin, society 
and the state  
There is a large number of well-known cases published in the medical literature or by the 
media in which patients and/or their families have spent long years in distress struggling to 
have an illness recognized as terminal in order to allow the sufferer to die with dignity and 
loved ones to mourn their loss. 
The hegemonic line of thought, however, considers death as a failure that should be delayed 
as long as possible. Sufferers (patients and/or their families) are thus severed from the 
decision-making process, and medicine, the courts and religious institutions are allowed to 
exercise their power over other people’s bodies even if, after a long pilgrimage, sufferers are 
granted what they have asked for. 
We have already commented on situations in which patients refused treatments which they 
considered futile or required measures to be taken so that they could die with dignity. We 
also examined the case of a patient who, having an illness which his physicians considered 
had reached its end-stage, first refused and then asked for support measures. 
Greater is the complexity of the cases in which patients are unable to express themselves 
and it is their family who ask for withdrawal of life-sustaining measures in the absence of 
the patients’ explicit statement of their will to do so.  
Patients in an irreversible permanent vegetative state are not considered terminally ill in the 
applicable definitions. Due to their brain injury, these patients have neither self-awareness 
nor awareness of the surroundings. They do not feel pain but they are able to breathe 
autonomously. They may have some reflex activity, including eye movements, grimacing 
and grunting. They are unable to take food or fluids by mouth and they require tube feeding 
for nutrition and hydration. The sleep-wake cycle is preserved and, if they are provided 
with adequate care, they do not look critically ill at first sight. A distinction should be made, 
however, between the irreversible permanent vegetative state and the potentially reversible 
persistent vegetative state. After coming out of a coma due to brain injury, a patient 
progresses to a vegetative state if sufficient sparing of the brain stem allows for preservation 
of his or her autonomic functions. Recovery from a vegetative state is unlikely after three 
months if brain damage is anoxic or a year if brain damage is traumatic; in those cases, the 
vegetative state is said to be permanent. “Vegetative” does not mean that the patient is a 
vegetable but that the so-called vegetative functions are preserved (breathing, heart rate, 
body temperature control, blood pressure, gastrointestinal motility, etc.) (The Multi-Society 
Task Force on PVS, 1994a, 1994b). The vegetative state must be distinguished from the 
minimally conscious state, in which the patient shows minimal self-awareness and 
awareness of the surroundings.  
Our purpose is to show that these medical conditions are seen from different perspectives 
by families, physicians, the courts and society at large. Some of them consider that these 
patients are terminally ill and that they are being subjected to futile treatments, whereas 
others see them as living patients who are comparable to other disabled individuals and 
whose life should be sustained regardless of their families’ wish or the wish they may have 
expressed when they were competent.  
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In 1975, 21-year-old Karen Ann Quinlan suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest after ingesting a 
combination of alcohol and tranquilizers. She subsequently went into a permanent 
vegetative state and was placed on mechanical ventilatory support. Hers was the first case 
in which parents requested withdrawal of the ventilator. Physicians turned down the 
request, so Mr. and Mrs. Quinlan resorted to the courts. New Jersey Supreme Court 
authorized the family’s request relying on the substituted judgment standard, which is 
intended first to determine the individual’s own needs and wishes and then to decide on 
how to proceed once his or her personal value system is known. In Quinlan’s case, the court 
sought to protect the autonomy of an individual who was unable to defend it on her own by 
honouring her parent's opinion (Beauchamp, Childress, 1999). Additionally, as Annas 
clearly recalls: “Since the court believed that the physicians were unwilling to withdraw the 
ventilator because of the fear of legal liability, not precepts of medical ethics, it devised a mechanism to 
grant the physicians prospective legal immunity for taking this action. Specifically, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that after a prognosis, confirmed by a hospital ethics committee, that there is 
“no reasonable possibility of a patient returning to a cognitive, sapient state,” life-sustaining 
treatment can be removed and no one involved, including the physicians, can be held civilly or 
criminally responsible for the death.” (Annas, 2005). 
Once ventilatory support was withdrawn, Karen continued breathing on her own and lived 
for another 9 years (10 years since she had suffered the cardiopulmonary arrest) still 
sustained by tube feeding. Her parents did not consider requesting discontinuation of 
artificial feeding (Kinney et al, 1994), which could mean that Karen’s parents considered that 
the need for ventilatory support indicated that her condition was terminal, while the other 
life-sustaining measures placed her in a different situation.  
Nancy Cruzan's case provides us with another context. Nancy was in a permanent 
vegetative state as a result of a car accident she had had in 1983 (Annas, 1990). She required 
tube feeding but not ventilatory support. When her parents were certain that she would not 
recover, they requested discontinuation of the treatment stating that this was Nancy’s desire 
as expressed by her in the past. Physicians did not accept treatment withdrawal, but the trial 
court authorized it. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court 
judgment and so did the U.S. Supreme Court (it was the first time that the U.S. Supreme 
Court had heard a case like this). Among the reasons provided, it was stated that even 
though a patient had the right to refuse treatment, the same decision made by surrogates on 
behalf of a previously competent patient could not be accepted. It was also expressed that 
the State should in principle favour the preservation of life and that the patient's decision as 
to the withdrawal of treatment should be practically indubitable (halfway between what 
society considers in that situation and what the law considers beyond any reasonable 
doubt). This last requirement limited the decision-making capacity of Nancy’s parents, who 
loved her beyond doubt.  
A new petition was submitted to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the court rejected it 
again stating that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Nancy would have refused 
tube feeding had she been alive. It was also added that artificial nutrition and hydration were 
considered ordinary treatment procedures which should be provided under any 
circumstances, and that the State’s interest in preserving life was absolute and unconditional. 
The State Court also expressed that although the patient is in an irreversible vegetative state, 
“She is not dead. She is not terminally ill. Medical experts testified that she could live another 
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thirty years"2 (Cruzan vs. Hamon, 1989). The U.S. Supreme Court, in turn, pointed out that 
tube feeding was an extraordinary treatment procedure which could be discontinued and 
that if there was enough evidence of the patient's wishes, artificial feeding could be removed. 
It also expressed that even though the State of Missouri should set the standard to discern 
what the patient's wishes were, it did not have the absolute right to deny refusal of treatment. 
In light of new evidence provided by Nancy’s friends and acquaintances with respect to what 
her wishes would have been in her situation, the Court of Missouri authorized the removal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration. The treatment was discontinued on December 15, 1990 and 
Nancy died 12 days later (Cruzan vs. Director, 1990). 
Although the definition of terminal disease was not the main discussion in this case, as 
seen above, it is explicitly mentioned by the Supreme Court of Missouri: “She is not 
terminally ill”. 
Dissenting opinions as regards Nancy's state were expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices and the President of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which are worth transcribing 
(Cruzan vs. Director, 1990). 
Justice Brennan from the U.S. Supreme Court, with whom Justices Marshal and Blackmun 
joined, expressed the following (bold emphasis is mine): 
"Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation where death 
commences while life, in some form, continues. Some patients, however, want no part of a life 
sustained only by medical technology. Instead, they prefer a plan of medical treatment that allows 
nature to take its course and permits them to die with dignity." 
“Nancy Cruzan has dwelt in that twilight zone for six years… The Court would make an 
exception here. It permits the State's abstract, undifferentiated interest in the preservation of life to 
overwhelm the best interests of Nancy Beth Cruzan, interests which would, according to an 
undisputed finding, be served by allowing her guardians to exercise her constitutional right 
to discontinue medical treatment. Ironically, the Court reaches this conclusion despite 
endorsing three significant propositions which should save it from any such dilemma. First, a 
competent individual's decision to refuse life-sustaining medical procedures is an aspect of liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, upon a proper 
evidentiary showing, a qualified guardian may make that decision on behalf of an 
incompetent ward. Third, in answering the important question presented by this tragic case, it is 
wise "'not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject.'". 
Together, these considerations suggest that Nancy Cruzan's liberty to be free from medical 
treatment must be understood in light of the facts and circumstances particular to her. A grown 
woman at the time of the accident, Nancy had previously expressed her wish to forgo continuing 
medical care under circumstances such as these. Her family and her friends are convinced that this 
is what she would want. A guardian ad litem appointed by the trial court is also convinced that 
this is what Nancy would want. Yet the Missouri Supreme Court, alone among state courts 
deciding such a question, has determined that an irreversibly vegetative patient will remain a 
passive prisoner of medical technology -- for Nancy, perhaps for the next 30 years.”  
Justice Stevens, in turn, extensively quotes Judge Blackmar from the Supreme Court of 
Missouri who explained that decisions about the care of chronically ill patients were 
traditionally private: "I would not accept the assumption, inherent in the principal opinion, that, 
with our advanced technology, the state must necessarily become involved in a decision about using 
extraordinary measures to prolong life. Decisions of this kind are made daily by the patient 
                                                 
2 Hereinafter bold emphasis is mine. 
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or relatives, on the basis of medical advice and their conclusion as to what is best. Very few 
cases reach court, and I doubt whether this case would be before us but for the fact that 
Nancy lies in a state hospital. I do not place primary emphasis on the patient's expressions, except 
possibly in the very unusual case, of which I find no example in the books, in which the patient 
expresses a view that all available life supports should be made use of. Those closest to the patient are 
best positioned to make judgments about the patient's best interest." 
“Judge Blackmar then argued that Missouri's policy imposed upon dying individuals and their 
families a controversial and objectionable view of life's meaning: "It is unrealistic to say that the 
preservation of life is an absolute, without regard to the quality of life. I make this statement 
only in the context of a case in which the trial judge has found that there is no chance for amelioration 
of Nancy's condition. The principal opinion accepts this conclusion. It is appropriate to consider 
the quality of life in making decisions about the extraordinary medical treatment. Those who 
have made decisions about such matters without resort to the courts certainly consider the quality of 
life, and balance this against the unpleasant consequences to the patient. There is evidence that Nancy 
may react to pain stimuli. If she has any awareness of her surroundings, her life must be a living hell. 
She is unable to express herself or to do anything at all to alter her situation. Her parents, who are 
her closest relatives, are best able to feel for her and to decide what is best for her. The state 
should not substitute its decisions for theirs. Nor am I impressed with the crypto-
philosophers cited in the principal opinion, who declaim about the sanctity of any life 
without regard to its quality. They dwell in ivory towers.”” 
 “Finally, Judge Blackmar concluded that the Missouri policy was illegitimate because it treats life 
as a theoretical abstraction, severed from, and indeed opposed to, the person of Nancy Cruzan, 
adding that “the Cruzan family appropriately came before the court seeking relief. The circuit 
judge properly found the facts and applied the law. His factual findings are supported by the record 
and his legal conclusions by overwhelming weight of authority. The principal opinion attempts to 
establish absolutes, but does so at the expense of human factors. In so doing it unnecessarily 
subjects Nancy and those close to her to continuous torture which no family should be forced to 
endure." 
 Justice Stevens, in turn, pointed out that “It is perhaps predictable that courts might undervalue 
the liberty at stake here. Because death is so profoundly personal, public reflection upon it is unusual. 
As this sad case shows, however, such reflection must become more common if we are to deal 
responsibly with the modern circumstances of death. Medical advances have altered the 
physiological conditions of death in ways that may be alarming: Highly invasive treatment 
may perpetuate human existence through a merger of body and machine that some might 
reasonably regard as an insult to life rather than as its continuation. But those same 
advances, and the reorganization of medical care accompanying the new science and 
technology, have also transformed the political and social conditions of death: People are 
less likely to die at home, and more likely to die in relatively public places, such as 
hospitals or nursing homes(…).The trial court's order authorizing Nancy's parents to cease their 
daughter's treatment would have permitted the family that cares for Nancy to bring to a close her 
tragedy and her death. Missouri's objection to that order subordinates Nancy's body, her family, and 
the lasting significance of her life to the State's own interests. The decision we review thereby 
interferes with constitutional interests of the highest order(...).It seems to me that the Court errs 
insofar as it characterizes this case as involving "judgments about the 'quality' of life that a 
particular individual may enjoy. " Nancy Cruzan is obviously "alive" in a physiological sense. 
But for patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness and no chance of recovery, 
there is a serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is "life" as that 
word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the Declaration 
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of Independence. The State's unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy Cruzan's 
physical existence is comprehensible only as an effort to define life's meaning, not as an 
attempt to preserve its sanctity(...).” 
In their words, these judges forestall several of the theses put forward in this document: the 
irreducibility of life to its mere biological nature, the need to consider such aspects as quality 
of life, the ability to stop the progression of a severe medical disease through technology (a 
disease which would be otherwise terminal) but, at the same time, the inability to reverse 
the condition, the fact that these cases are usually settled in a different way when decision-
making occurs within the family circle (Nancy's case reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
because she was hospitalized in a state hospital).   
A very different case (the reverse of the preceding one) is that of Helga Wanglie, an 86-year-
old patient who died after being in a vegetative state for more than a year (Miles, 1991). At 
the age of 85, she was hospitalized with symptoms of shortness of breath caused by chronic 
bronchiectasis. She required emergency intubation. During hospitalization, she 
acknowledged discomfort and occasionally recognized her family. Five months later, she 
was referred to a chronic care facility after several unsuccessful attempts to withdraw 
ventilatory support. A week later, she experienced a cardiopulmonary arrest, from which 
she was successfully resuscitated. She was then transferred to an intensive care unit, where 
she was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy. Physicians suggested removing 
the ventilator first a month and then two months after diagnosis. They did not believe that 
ventilatory support would benefit the patient in any way. The family, however, rejected this 
suggestion saying that doctors should not play God and that Helga would not be better off 
dead. They also added that she had not expressed any decisions with respect to such a 
situation. Ten months after her first admission and five months after the cardiopulmonary 
arrest, Helga was still unconscious and supported by a ventilator. A medical consultant 
whose opinion was requested at that time considered that the patient was at the end of her 
life, and that mechanical ventilation was not beneficial for the patient, that it would not cure 
her lung condition and that she would not survive without it. However, because ventilation 
could prolong life, it could not be considered futile. The conflict between the family and the 
hospital, which held that it was not obliged to provide non-beneficial medical treatment, 
was finally taken to court. It was first determined that the hospital had no financial 
interesting in withdrawing treatment since expenses were covered by Medicare for the first 
hospitalization and by a private insurance for the second one. The trial court also appointed 
the patient’s husband as the person who could best represent her interests. In the light of 
uncertainty about its legal obligation, the hospital decided to continue providing the 
treatment. However, Mrs. Wanglie died of septicemia three days after the court ruling.  
The debate that followed was largely focused on discussing that while there is general 
agreement that patients may refuse treatment, it is arguable whether they or their families 
have the right to claim for any kind of medical treatment, regardless of its efficacy, 
additionally bringing up the issue of fair distribution of healthcare resources into the 
discussion.  
What was interesting about the court decision was that it asserted the family’s right to make 
decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient (Angell, 1991). However, it did not bring into 
consideration the discussion about the contents of their decision and its eventual futility.  
From the physicians’ point of view, Helga was terminally ill. The family, however, did not 
seem to consider the concept of terminality as a point of discussion. What mattered to them 
was that the patient was alive and that her state was better than being dead.  
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“For the first time in the history of the United States, Congress met in a special emergency session on 
Sunday, March 20, to pass legislation aimed at the medical care of one patient — Terri Schiavo. 
President George W. Bush encouraged the legislation and flew back to Washington, D.C., from his 
vacation in Crawford, Texas, so that he could be on hand to sign it immediately. In a statement issued 
three days earlier, he said: “The case of Terri Schiavo raises complex issues(. . . . Those who live at the 
mercy of others deserve our special care and concern. It should be our goal as a nation to build a 
culture of life, where all Americans are valued, welcomed, and protected — and that culture of life 
must extend to individuals with disabilities.” (Annas, 2005) This is how Annas describes the 
shock produced by the decision of the courts of Florida to authorize withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration from Terri Schiavo, a patient who was in a permanent vegetative 
state. 
In 1990, when she was 27 years-old, Terri had a cardiac arrest, which was probably caused 
by hypokalemia induced by an eating disorder. She progressed to a permanent vegetative 
state due to the resulting hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy and she required tube feeding 
placement. Eight years later, her husband requested legal authorization to discontinue tube 
feeding. A judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Terri was in a 
permanent vegetative state and that had she been able to decide on her own, she would 
have chosen to discontinue the treatment. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and 
the Supreme Court of Florida declined to review it. The situation was somehow similar to 
that after the final decision in Nancy Cruzan’s case.  
However, the case became more complex and sparked nationwide debate and 
international attraction when Terri’s parents claimed that there was evidence of treatment 
which would help her recover from her condition. This claim was refuted by three of the 
five experts asked to examine the patient (two appointed by Terri's husband, two by her 
parents and one by the trial court judge). The Supreme Court of Florida refused to hear an 
appeal again on the grounds that the parents had no standing to bring it. The State 
Legislature, in turn, passed a bill which gave Governor Jeb Bush the authority to order the 
reinsertion of the feeding tube (it had been removed after the court decision), which was 
reinserted as ordered. The Supreme Court of Florida declared that the law was 
unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal brought by the 
Governor. The trial court judge finally ordered the tube to be withdrawn on March 18,  
at 1 p.m.  
Amidst death threats against one of the judges, and after another unsuccessful attempt by 
the Florida Legislature to pass a new bill aimed at restoring Terri’s tube feeding, the U.S. 
Congress met in an emergency session, interrupting their Easter recess, in order to pass a 
bill which would allow Terri’s parents to bring an appeal. In spite of this, Terri’s parents 
could not modify the court decision and Terri finally died on March 25, 2005. 
In this particular case, the concept of terminal disease was not openly discussed. However, 
it could be said that it was implicitly present in more than one aspect of the debate. The 
possibility of maintaining a patient in a permanent vegetative state, "suspended" for an 
indefinite period of time as opposed to an advanced cancer patient, led some people to 
consider Terri as a terminally ill patient whose life was being artificially sustained, while 
others believed that she was not actually terminally ill. In the first case, tube feeding was 
considered futile, a measure which undermined the patient's dignity and whose withdrawal 
would allow for her condition to follow its natural course; in other words, it would allow 
the patient to die. In the second case, the treatment was deemed vital since its 
discontinuation would lead to the patient's death (she would be killed instead of being 
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allowed to die). Those who argued for the withdrawal believed that the patient's wishes, or 
the wishes of those who represented her interests, would be violated if treatment was 
withheld; while those who opposed discontinuation considered treatment withdrawal as an 
offense against life.   
In the debate held in the U.S. House of Representatives, several of its members showed crass 
ignorance of what an irreversible vegetative state is. Furthermore, some members who are 
also physicians offered their opinions about Terri's condition without conducting their own 
examinations (Quill, 2005). 
The media, in turn, showed people, some of them were children, trying to bring Terri a glass 
of water, claiming that she was being starved to death and dehydrated (this shows that most 
people ignored the patient's real condition — she was unable to swallow and feel hunger or 
thirst). 
A similar case was debated in Argentina, though it did not have the same impact as Terri’s 
case in the United States. A female patient (MdelC) had been in a permanent vegetative state 
under her husband’s care for two years. She progressed to that state after suffering heart 
failure when giving birth to her fourth child (all the children were under the father’s care 
after that tragic event). In 2000, the patient's husband (AMG) petitioned the court for 
withdrawal of tube feeding, but her parents objected to the request.  
In his critical review of the decision adopted by the courts of the Province of Buenos Aires 
(Argentina) with regard to this case, Dr. Carlos Gherardi clearly shows how ignorance 
and prejudice may lead to unfounded decisions (Gherardi, 2007). It is worth quoting what 
he wrote in the introduction to his review: “We should start by transcribing the description of 
the patient provided by the Counsel for Minors and Incompetent Persons, which was repeatedly 
quoted in the relevant judgments: “I was really surprised because I did not find what I had 
expected. Based on the diagnosis, I thought I would find a physically impaired person, who would 
be completely unable to move, asleep, dishevelled, and connected to a mechanical respirator and 
machines controlling her heart rate, but the truth is that I found a woman with a very good 
physical appearance. She was breathing on her own and there were no machines controlling her. 
She only has a feeding tube which provides her with nutrition and hydration. I was really shocked 
to see her blink, she looked towards different places, she coughed and moved when doing so, and she 
made some facial gestures.” The Counsel requested the petition to be dismissed “in limine” on the 
grounds of the defense of the right to life and because he considered that if the petition were 
sustained, it would eventually constitute neglect followed by death or aggravated homicide. In his 
argumentation, the Counsel makes reference to the Creator and the Parable of the Talents. He 
concludes that: “the hope for a Miracle should never be abandoned. Love and faith will always 
dwell in a heroic heart. And, waiting for God’s time, which we know is different from man’s time, 
is an act of heroism.”. 
This unusual account, made by the only court officer who actually saw the patient, seems to be 
referring to an individual in a nearly normal condition when, in fact, the patient is a person who has 
tragically and irreversible lost all cognitive activity, and who does not exhibit the essential 
communicative skills and affective expression inherent to a person’s identity. It is quite clear that this 
account had an impact on the judges and that it was considered reliable by them, since it was 
frequently quoted by the Court Attorney and some of the judges when providing the reasons for their 
votes. The probably erroneous perception of those who had to decide on such a complex and debatable 
issue may have been enhanced by the fact that none of them actually saw the patient and that they did 
not take into account the evidence provided by the various witnesses (family members, professionals, 
priests). Even though there was no procedural obligation, nothing prevented the judges from hearing 
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the witnesses’ statements, which would have contributed to their knowledge of the case. It is hard to 
believe that none of the judges felt the moral obligation to see the patient or meet her husband and 
children to evaluate the situation of the family.”  
Dr. Gherardi adds that “the patient's husband expressed that he did not know what her preferences 
were with respect to life-sustaining measures. However, two people who were close to the patient, one 
of them was a psychologist, stated that the patient had previously told them that if she had been in 
such a condition, she would not have wished to be kept alive. These statements were not taken into 
account by the judges and they were not accepted as witnesses, and neither were others who offered 
their testimony.”. 
The courts not only rejected the evidence provided by a psychologist and one of the 
patient’s friends about her preferences, but it also based its considerations on an 
erroneous interpretation of the purpose of medicine ("to defend life at all costs"), the 
patient’s medical condition, the situation the family was going through, and the suffering 
endured by those who took care of the patient, especially her husband. One of the judges 
(who never actually saw the patient) reveals an absolute lack of respect for the patient and 
her caregivers when he appeals to a possible miracle and calls for heroism while waiting 
for God’s time. Should not therapeutic obstinacy be considered as an example of man’s 
challenge to God’s time?  
Regardless of technological advances and the development of new goals, just as before, 
today’s medicine will seldom cure, will often provide relief and will always have to 
comfort. It is not its objective to defeat death, because human beings are doomed to die. It 
should try to avoid early death but it should also allow patients to die in peace. And, it 
should not defend life at all costs since, in doing so, it would fall into such a negative 
value as therapeutic obstinacy. Allowing a dying person to die is not the same as killing 
him or her. By showing respect for a dignified death, we are also dignifying life. We 
dignify others when we consider them as persons, when we respect them, listen to them, 
watch them, talk to them. In the abovementioned case, regardless of the adopted decision, 
the judges showed a clear lack of respect for the patient's dignity in their failure to see or 
listen. With their behaviour, they ultimately showed the opposite side of therapeutic 
obstinacy: neglect.  
3. Conclusion 
We usually define “terminal disease” as a pathological condition that cannot be cured and, 
in spite of the treatments applied, it will end up in the death of the patient in a short period 
of time, i.e. 6 months. We consider that this definition is unilateral (made up by physicians). 
We propose that the real meaning should come up as a construction based on the dialogue 
between patients, their families, caregivers and healthcare workers. In addition, this process 
should be developed by incorporating the cultural concepts of the society in which each 
individual lives. The aim of this construction is to show that the meaning of “terminal 
disease” is not unique but multidimensional, since it can change depending on the 
circumstances.  
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health management in a way that would be satisfying for academicians and practitioners. It is designed to be a
forum for the experts in the thematic area to exchange viewpoints, and to present health management's state-
of-art as a scientific and professional domain.
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